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The legal profession is currently the subject of much criti-
cism. A recent opinion survey of public confidence in sixteen
institutions ranked law firms next to last, tied with organized
labor, finishing barely ahead of advertising agencies.' As if
Watergate were not enough, the papers are now reporting on
lawyers who attempt to make a fast buck on sensational cases.2
Traditionally "self-regulated," the legal profession is facing the
prospect of control from the outside from consumer groups and
governmental units.3 However, there is evidence in Kentucky
as well as elsewhere that members of the legal profession are
seeking to improve self-regulation by means of attorney-
discipline systems. Les Whitmer, director of the Kentucky Bar
Association, reports that his case load of disciplinary matters
has doubled in the past three years.4
Some have charged that self-regulation has collapsed ex-
cept for the expulsion of felons. 5 However, the decisions from
the last term of the Kentucky Supreme Court are substantially
broader in scope and illustrate the Court's concern with attor-
neys who neglect clients' affairs and those who compromise
their loyalty to a client in disregard for the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Lawyer misconduct traditionally has been div-
ided into that occurring within a lawyer's professional capacity
and that occurring outside of his professional capacity.' The
* Adjunct Instructor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1968, Wheaton Col-
lege; J.D. 1971, University of Illinois. Sole practitioner, Danville, Kentucky.
I Falk, Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
2 Id. Philip Peltz, hired to represent David Berkowitz, the accused in the "Son of
Sam" murders, offered for sale taped interviews with his client for sums in excess of
$100,000. The public was further outraged to learn that, although a convicted felon,
Peltz was allowed to retain his license to practice law in New York.
3 Marks and Cathcart, Discipline Within the Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?,
1974 ILL. L.F. 193.
1 Presentation to a University of Kentucky Professional Responsibility Class, Jan.
25, 1977.
5 Garbus and Seligman, Sanctions and Disbarment: They Sit in Judgment, in
VERDICTS ON LAwYERs 47, 48 (R. Nader and R. Green eds. 1976). See Steele and Nim-
mer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional Regulation, 1976 A.B.F. RE. J. 919.
1 ABA Formal Opinion 339 (1974) confirms the application of the Code of Profes-
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four cases to be discussed in the first section involve lawyers
who were disciplined for criminal activity or nonprofessional
misconduct. The second section will analyze three cases deal-
ing with lawyers who received sanctions for professional mis-
conduct.7
I. NON-PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT
Kentucky continues to discipline lawyers for non-
professional misconduct on the grounds that it is conduct that
brings the bench and bar into disrepute.' The majority of disci-
plinary cases decided last term involved lawyers convicted of
criminal acts.
In Kentucky Bar Association v. Pope9 the Supreme Court
disbarred a private practitioner-Commonwealth's Attorney in
accordance with Rule of the Supreme Court (RSC) 3.320,10
sional Responsibility to a lawyer's conduct arising from a non-professional as well as a
professional capacity.
7 Only seven of the 10 cases dealing with professional responsibility decided by
the Court this term will be discussed. The remaining three involved appeals from
opinions of the Kentucky Bar Association Ethics Committee. See Federal Intermediate
Credit Bank of Louisville v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 540 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. 1976); DeJonge
v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 540 S.W.2d 601 (Ky. 1976); Tucker v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n,
550 S.W.2d 467 (Ky. 1976).
' See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Vincent, 537 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Ky. 1976). In that case
Vincent had been convicted of willfully and knowingly failing to file income tax re-
turns. As a result, he was suspended from the practice of law for six months. The Court
indicated that apart from any consideration of whether the crime was a felony, serious
misdemeanor, or one which involved moral turpitude, "the real criterion is and should
be whether the attorney is guilty of such unprofessional and uethical conduct which is
calculated to bring the bench and bar into disrepute." 537 S.W.2d at 173. The Court
then articulated a seemingly high standard which should govern attorney conduct:
He [the lawyer] is an officer of the court . . . and it is his duty-yes, even
more so, it is his responsibility-to conduct his personal and professional life
in a manner as to be above reproach. Is this too much to ask of any attorney?
We think not. Other than one's own confidante, no person occupies such
close relationship to the general public as do the members of the legal profes-
sion. It is the attorney to whom the intimacies of family relations are con-
fided; ...it is the attorney who is entrusted with the protection of our
constitutional and statutory rights. Such a burden resting upon the members
of the legal profession must not be taken lightly. "* * * that you will faith-
fully execute, to the best of your ability, the office of attorney at law * * *"
are not idle words, to which all attorneys have pledged their allegiance. The
conduct of even one attorney which would embarrass the legal profession will
not be tolerafed.
Id.
549 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. 1976).
o RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT [hereinafter cited as RSC] 3.320 provides:
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which requires automatic disbarment for conviction of a fe-
lony." Pope entered a plea of nolo contendere'2 to the offenses
of attempting to evade income tax by means of a false and
fraudulent income tax return 3 and knowingly making and sub-
scribing an untrue and incorrect income tax return" for the
calendar year 1971.
The Supreme Court also sanctioned attorneys in three
cases involving federal misdemeanor convictions for failure to
file income tax returns. 5 Kentucky Bar Association v. Vincent'"
was cited as controlling. The first of these cases, Kentucky Bar
Association v. Kramer,7 involved a lawyer who was convicted
pursuant to his plea of nolo contendere, fined seventy-five
hundred dollars and sentenced to one year on each of three
counts of failure to file federal income tax returns for 1970,
1971, and 1972. The Court was not impressed by the attorney's
When any member of the Association has been convicted of a serious misde-
meanor or of a felony a copy of the judgment shall be filed with the Court
by the President or Vice-President. If the offense is a felony or if it is a
misdemeanor which the court finds to involve dishonesty or stealing within
the concept of Cotton v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 454 S.W. (2d) 698, the mem-
ber shall be suspended ipso facto. If no appeal is taken the Court shall enter
an order of disbarment. In the event an appeal is taken from such conviction,
the final question of discipline shall be deferred until such time as the Court
finally determines the matter.
If such appeal results in affirmance of the conviction, then an order of
disbarment shall issue forthwith. If the appeal results in reversal, without
retrial, then procedures shall be concluded and the suspension shall termi-
nate. If such reversal involves retrial, the suspension shall cease and the
matter shall be held in abeyance until such time as the retrial is concluded.
If reconvicted, the foregoing procedures shall be as upon the first conviction
as hereinabove set out. If not convicted upon such retrial, all proceedings
shall cease.
" RSC 3.320 was amended effective January 1, 1978. The new rule provides:
When any member of the Association has been convicted of a felony or class
"A" misdemeanor a copy of the judgment shall be filed with the Director [of
the Kentucky Bar Association] for action under Rule 3.160. The Director
shall submit copies of the judgment to the Tribunal who take action under
Rule 3.165.
,1 For purposes of disciplinary measures this is treated as a plea of guilty according
to Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Taylor, 549 S.W.2d 508 (Ky. 1976).
' 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1970).
" 26 U.S.C. § 7206 (1970).
" 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1970). For comment on the problem of lawyers and income
tax offenses see Stoddard and Stutsman, Income Tax Offenses by Lawyers: An Ethical
Problem, 58 A.B.A.J. 842 (1972).
Is 537 S.W.2d 171 (Ky. 1976).
17 555 S.W.2d 245 (Ky. 1977).
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argument of mitigating circumstances. He referred to his ear-
lier substantial income resulting in previous payments of in-
come tax in the five-figure range, his fine professional reputa-
tion, and his disgust for the Nixon administration prompting
a "mental block" when it came to filling out the tax form.
Kramer was found guilty of unethical and unprofessional con-
duct under RSC 3.1308 and suspended from the practice of law
for a period of six months.
Second in this group of cases was Kentucky Bar Associa-
tion v. Trimble. 9 Trimble was charged with three counts of
failure to file federal income tax returns for the calendar years
1967, 1968, and 1969. Pursuant to a plea of nolo contendere, he
was found guilty on count three and sentenced to one year in
prison. Proceedings were commenced under current RSC
3.320. ° The Court remanded the proceedings to the Kentucky
Bar Association for proceedings consistent with the rules pre-
vailing at the time the offenses were committed. 2 Finding that
the lawyer's conduct constituted unethical and unprofessional
conduct calculated to bring the bench and bar into disrepute,
the Court suspended Trimble for six months. Mitigating cir-
cumstances such as the lawyer's divorce, overburdening in-
debtedness, and high degree of competence as a lawyer did not
deter the Court from its course commenced in Vincent.2
,8 RSC 3.130 provides:
The court recognizes and accepts the principles embodied in the American
Bar Association's code of professional responsibility as a sound statement of
the standard of professional conduct required of members of the bar, and the
board may cause to be tried all charges brought under this code as well as
charges for other unprofessional or unethical conduct calculated to bring the
bench and bar into disrepute.
" 540 S.W.2d 599 (Ky. 1976).
20 See supra note 11 for the text of current RSC 3.320.
21 RSC 3.320 became effective on July 2, 1971. Prior to that date Kentucky Court
of Appeals Rule 3.330 was controlling:
Whenever it shall come to the attention of the board that an attorney had
been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, it shall order the
director to promptly obtain a certified copy of the judgment of conviction.
The board shall direct that a charge be filed against such attorney. If an
answer is filed from which it appears that facts or circumstances may exist
which would be in mitigation of the offense or of the discipline which may
be imposed,-the board may order the appointment of a trial committee and
the board shall'by order confine the issues to be considered, and the eviden-
tiary material to be received.
11 The Court waxed eloquent in quoting from Omar Khayyam: .'The moving
[Vol. 66
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The third member of this trilogy of cases was Kentucky
Bar Association v. Taylor.3 Taylor had already been suspended
for six months in 1972 for intimidation of a witness and being
disrespectful in the courtroom.Y Respondent entered a nolo
contendere plea to failure to file federal income tax returns for
the calendar years 1968, 1969, and 1970 and was sentenced to
one year imprisonment on each count. The Supreme Court
found him guilty of unethical and unprofessional conduct cal-
culated to bring the bench and bar into disrepute and sus-
pended him from the practice of law for six months. No miti-
gating circumstances were discussed. It should be noted that
this case had been remanded to the Board of Governors in 1974
following a decision by the Court that the Bar could not pro-
ceed under RSC 3.320 since it was not in effect at the time of
the criminal offense. 25
The Kramer, Trimble, and Taylor cases evidence the Su-
preme Court's concern for uniformity of sanctions for similar
attorney misconduct. Lawyers should be on notice that one or
more convictions for failure to file a federal income tax return
will result in a six-month suspension from practice regardless
of the mitigating circumstances. All three cases were consid-
ered under court rules in effect prior to July 1, 1971. By apply-
ing the unprofessional and unethical conduct section of the
rules, the Court has avoided direct confrontation of the ques-
tion of whether failure to file a federal income tax return consti-
tutes conduct involving dishonesty or stealing within the con-
cept of Cotton v. Commonwealth.26 The Court has yet to disbar
an attorney for a conviction of a misdemeanor under the new
rule.
The Court often has been troubled by its decisions in
Kentucky State Bar Association v. McAfee 7 and Kentucky
finger writes; and, having writ, moves on: Nor all your piety nor wit shall lure it back
to cancel half a line nor all your tears wash out a word of it."' 540 S.W.2d at 601.
549 S.W.2d 508 (Ky. 1976).
24 Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Taylor, 482 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1972).
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Taylor, 516 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. 1974). In this case, the
former Court of Appeals refused to adopt the Kentucky Bar Association's interpreta-
tion of RCA 3.320. The Bar contended that automatic disbarment ought to be had
upon any conviction of a serious misdemeanor regardless of whether it was a crime of
moral turpitude.
21 454 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1970).
- 301 S.W.2d 899 (Ky. 1957). The Court later reaffirmed its decision in McAfee,
1978]
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State Bar Association v. Brown.2 McAfee was convicted of the
misdemeanor of failure to file a federal income tax return while
Brown was convicted of income tax evasion, a felony. McAfee's
conduct was not found to involve moral turpitude, but he did
receive a reprimand. The disciplinary proceeding against
Brown was dismissed. In Kentucky Bar Association v. Ball2'
the Court discussed its decisions in the earlier cases explaining
its adherence to a California opinion that was later overruled.
Despite the earlier decisions, it seems the Court would be hard-
pressed to defend the position that a conviction of failure to file
federal income tax returns does not involve dishonest conduct.
Certainly, a lawyer who knows that he is legally bound to file
an income tax return and does not do so acts dishonestly."
II. PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT
The Court considered occurrences of professional misconduct
ranging from a violation of the Code's rules against advertising
to borrowing money from an opposing party in a divorce action.
There is little information supplied about the attorney's con-
duct in Kentucky Bar Association v. Albert3' other than that
it was in violation of Disciplinary Rule (DR) 2-103 of the Code
of Professionally Responsibility, which governs the recommen-
dation of professional employment. Albert's conduct probably
involved suggesting his employment to a non-client or employ-
ing a third party to solicit business. The Court adopted the
recommendation of the Board of Governors and reprimanded
the attorney. Although the Court traditionally has been active
in the area of sanctions for violations of Canon 2 of the Code,32
the disciplinary activity will undoubtedly decrease in light of
the United States Supreme Court decision in Bates & O'Steen
v. State Bar of Arizona33 and the resulting uncertainty of the
noting that it did not condone the conduct. See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Vincent, 537
S.W.2d 171, 172 (Ky. 1976).
21 302 S.W.2d 834 (Ky. 1957).
- 501 S.W.2d 253 (Ky. 1973)..
'* See Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 476, 483, (1975).
31 549 S.W.2d 295 (Ky. 1976).
32 See In re Rielley, 310 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1957); In re Walton, 310 S.W.2d 524 (Ky.
1957); In re Richard, 244 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1951).
97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
[Vol. 66
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status of Kentucky's current Disciplinary Rules pertaining to
advertising.
John W. Murphy, Jr., the lawyer involved in Kentucky
Bar Association v. Murphy, 3 failed to attend a deposition
taken by the opposing party, failed to offer proof on behalf of
his client, and failed to take any action to protect his client's
interest after judgment was entered for the opposing party in
a lawsuit dealing with title to real estate. The Court was not
convinced by the lawyer's claim that he had withdrawn as
counsel since his signature appeared on an order directing him
to complete proof within thirty days. Kentucky Bar Associa-
tion v. Dillman was cited as controlling authority concerning
the penalty. Murphy was suspended for one year. However, the
Court discussed neither the merits of the client's case nor the
harm that befell the client as a consequence of Murphy's neg-
lect. In the absence of this information it is difficult to compare
the penalty with that of Dillman. However, it is clear that the
Court is imposing a harsher penalty for lawyer neglect of
client's affairs (one year) than it is for lawyer criminal conduct
constituting a misdemeanor (six months). This case is particu-
larly important since it signals the Court's imposition of a
fairly serious sanction in an area that poses problems for every
practicing attorney beset with an overwhelming caseload and
insufficient means for controlling it. Murphy's neglect could
easily be repeated by any practitioner. The attorney faces the
two-edged sword of malpractice and discipline for such neglect.
Kentucky Bar Association v. DeCamillis" marks the
Court's use of disbarment as a sanction which is generally lim-
ited to lawyers convicted of felonies or conduct approximating
criminal conduct such as misuse or conversion of a client's
funds. 7 This decision clearly removes Kentucky from the list
of jurisdictions where the disciplinary apparatus simply imi-
tates the criminal justice system. The case also illustrates the
Supreme Court's attempt to intensify the deterrence value of
the disciplinary rules other than those pertaining to advertising
11 549 S.W.2d 295 (Ky. 1976).
31 539 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1976).
: 547 S.W.2d 446 (Ky. 1977).
' See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Friedlander, 536 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1976); Kentucky
Bar Ass'n v. Tucker, 535 S.W.2d 97 (Ky. 1975); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Colis, 535
S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1975).
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and solicitation. This deterrent had heretofore been missing.
DeCamillis did not fail to act for his client in the same sense
as Murphy but failed to insulate himself from outside influ-
ences as lawyers are required to do under Canon 5 of the Code.
Acting as attorney for Jacqueline Foley in a divorce proceeding
against her husband, DeCamillis contacted the husband in
advance of a hearing to determine the disposition of property.
He did this even though Mr. Foley was then represented by
counsel. The Court found this to violate DR 7-104(A). 3 In addi-
tion, the attorney borrowed fifteen hundred dollars from Mr.
Foley. Later, the attorney again saw Mr. Foley, who was con-
cerned about DeCamillis' fees and the disposition of the cou-
ple's furniture. Without consulting his client, DeCamillis
promised to buy furniture for Mrs. Foley from his own funds
and drafted a document stating that all of Mrs. Foley's attor-
neys fees had been paid. The Court found the acceptance of the
fifteen hundred dollar loan to be in violation of DR 5-101(A),39
5-105(A),40 and 5-107(A)(2). 41 The Court further noted that the
client should have been consulted before waiver of the fees. 42
11 DISCIPLINARY RULE 7-104(A)(1), AmiFncAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL REsPoNSmEBrr [hereinafter cited as DR] provides:
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not: Com-
municate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representa-
tion with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter
unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party
or is authorized by law to do so.
" DR 5-101(A) provides: "Except with the consent of his client after full disclo-
sure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment
on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial,
business, property, or personal interests."
40 DR 5-105(A) provides: "A lawyer shall decline proferred employment if the
exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is
likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, except
to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C)." DR 5-105(C) allows the attorney to
represent multiple clients only if "it is obvious that he can adequately represent the
interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the
possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent professional
judgment on behalf of each."
11 DR 5-107(A) (2) provides: "Except with the consent of his client after full disclo-
sure, a lawyer shall not: . . . Accept from one other than his client anything of value
related to his representation of or his employment by his client."
12 The Court also cited ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 5-1, 5-2, AMEImcAN BAR ASSoCIA-
TION CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIaUrM, which set the stage for the aforementioned
disciplinary rules:
EC 5-1 The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within
1978] KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
Buying furniture for the client constituted advancing funds to
the client to pursue litigation in violation of DR 5-103(B)."
In what may be described as its most surprising and
harshest disciplinary decision to date, the Court disbarred
DeCamillis for totally disregarding certain prohibitions of the
Code.44 There is no more basic provision than DR 7-104(A) in
the area of a lawyer's conduct in litigation. The rule would
seem to be more than a matter of simple professional courtesy
but would also suggest the Bar's concern with opposing coun-
sel's securing an unfair advantage. The adverse party might
misconceive the duty owed to him by the opponent's lawyer
and thus place undue reliance on that lawyer. Ethical Consid-
eration 7-18 of the Code says that the reason for the rule is that
the "legal system in its broadest sense functions best when
persons in need of legal advice or assistance are represented by
their own counsel." In making the adverse party his creditor,
DeCamillis also violated DR 9-101, which provides that a law-
yer should avoid even the appearance of impropriety. As the
Court noted, such a move smacked of bribery, occurring as it
did during the course of a divorce proceeding. According to the
opinion, Mr. Foley obtained the consent of his own counsel
prior to making the loan. Ironically enough, this same attorney
is the one who sought a continuance in order for Mrs. Foley to
the bounds of the law, soley for the benefit of his client and free of compro-
mising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interest
of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute
his loyalty to his client.
EC 5-2 . . . . "After accepting employment, a lawyer carefully should refrain from
acquiring a property right or assuming a position that would tend to make his judg-
ment less protective of the interests of his client."
" DR 5-103(B) provides:
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending
litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his
client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses or litiga-
tion, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical
examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the
client remains ultimately liable for such expenses.
" See Carpenter v. State Bar of California, 292 P. 450 (Cal. 1930). See generally
Annot., 1 A.L.R. 3d 1113 (1965). Many observers believe the Court's "get tough" policy
was first announced in Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Getty, 535 S.W.2d 91 (Ky. 1975). In
Getty the lawyer had been held in contempt of court and in disregard of the court's
warnings. The Supreme Court indicated that the fact that Getty had been held in
contempt did not preclude disciplinary action, but reinforced the need for such disci-
pline. Getty was suspended by the Court from the practice of law for six months.
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obtain other counsel and who advised the Court of DeCamillis'
unethical conduct. It appears that DeCamillis met with Mr.
Foley on more than one occasion making arrangements suitable
to him rather than to his own client. Clearly the lawyer failed
to represent zealously his own client 5 and failed to exercise his
judgment solely for the benefit of his client.46
CONCLUSION
The disciplinary cases decided by the Supreme Court this
past term are evidence of its effort to improve self-regulation
of the profession. The Court should be commended on impos-
ing sanctions in the traditional area of criminal misconduct as
well as in other areas involving attorney neglect and disloyalty
to clients. Lawyers should pay particular attention to the ever-
present danger of neglect of a client's affairs. Finally, all practi-
tioners should take time to familiarize themselves thoroughly
with the Code of Professional Responsibility.
4 CANON 7, AMERICAN BAR AssoCI7ON CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RssPoNSmrrY.
46 See note 42 supra for the text of EC 5-1, 5-2, which deal with the lawyer's
exercise of judgment solely for his client's benefit.
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